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The Australian Privacy Foundation 
The Australian Privacy Foundation is the main non-governmental organisation dedicated to protecting 
the privacy rights of Australians. The Foundation aims to focus public attention on emerging issues which 
pose a threat to the freedom and privacy of Australians. Since 1987, the Foundation has led the defence 
of the right of individuals to control their personal information and to be free of excessive intrusions. 
The Foundation uses the Australian Privacy Charter as a benchmark against which laws, regulations and 
privacy invasive initiatives can be assessed. For further information about the Foundation and the 
Charter, see www.privacy.org.au  
Please note that APF does not have a single postal address – we prefer communication by e-mail.  If a 
postal address is required please contact the signatory.  
Publication of submissions 
We have no objection to the publication of this submission in full. To further the public interest in 
transparency of public policy processes, APF strongly supports the position that all submissions to public 
Inquiries and reviews should be publicly available, except to the extent that a submitter has reasonable 
grounds for confidentiality for all, or preferably part of, a submission. 
Background 
In its 2008 report, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC) recommended that the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) be amended to include a new Part 
requiring mandatory data breach notifications, when personal information has been exposed to an 
unauthorised person, and there is a real risk of serious harm1. The recommendations relating to data 
breach notifications were not addressed in the first stage of the Government’s response to the ALRC 
report, released in October 2009, with consideration of this issue postponed to a second stage. The 
Discussion Paper released by Commonwealth Attorney-General’s in October 2012 is the Government’s 
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first step in responding to the data breach notification recommendations. This submission responds to 
the questions raised in the Discussion Paper. 
Current position 
Data breach notification has been addressed in guidelines released by the Privacy Commissioner/Office 




 set out the following four steps 
to consider in responding to a data breach or suspected breach: 
 Contain the breach and do a preliminary assessment; 
 Evaluate the risks associated with the breach; 
 Notification; 
 Prevent future breaches. 
In relation to notification, the guidelines provide that this should be considered in the context of the 
particular circumstances of the breach. While the guidelines point out that notification may be an 
‘important mitigation strategy’, they provide that whether or not a breach should be notified should be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. 
In general, unless there is a suspected breach of the data security principle, or of the credit reporting 
provisions, the PC/OAIC has no power to investigate, or otherwise respond to, data breaches. 
Accordingly, compliance with the PC/OAIC guidelines is entirely voluntary. Moreover, the guidelines are 
pitched at a very high level of generality, providing data controllers with a high degree in flexibility in 
responding to data breaches, but little specific guidance.  
We note that the PC/OAIC now regularly receives voluntary notifications – 46 in the 2011-2012 year, 56 
in 2010-11 and 44 in 2009-10; but there is no way of telling what proportion of actual breaches this 
represents – it is reasonable to suppose that it is a small minority even of significant breaches (see below 
for discussion of ‘significance’ criteria). The Discussion Paper notes that in 2010-11 the Privacy 





The APF welcomes the government’s decision to bring forward public discussion of this issue, which was 
previously relegated to the currently unscheduled second tranche’ of the government’s response to the 
ALRC report.  APF has consistently argued that breach notification requirements should be introduced 
earlier rather than later.  We submit that where breach notification requirements have been introduced 
overseas, they have provided a powerful stimulus to corporate attention to privacy compliance.   
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 Because of  ill-advised amendments in 2010 there is now much confusion about the respective roles of the 
Privacy Commissioner (PC) and  the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC).  For the purpose of  
this submission we use the joint acronym PC/OAIC – the necessary distinction can be made at the legislative 
drafting stage of any notification scheme. 
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 OAIC, Data breach notification: A guide to handling personal information security breaches (April 2012). 
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 The 2011-12 OAIC Annual Report confirms this figure, and 37 own motion investigation in 2011-12, although it is 
not clear that all of these OMIs in either year involved security breaches. 
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Unfortunately, through a combination of weak and ambiguous obligations, limited legal sanctions and 
lack of effective enforcement activity, privacy compliance has been a low priority in Australian 
boardrooms and government agency management teams.  The absence of a body of privacy 
jurisprudence and of examples of  significant penalties for non-compliance has made it very difficult for 
privacy officers and others with an interest in strong privacy compliance to sell the need for compliance 
measures as a priority even within regulatory/compliance teams, let alone as a wider governance and 
risk management issue.  
This environment means that the value of mandatory data breach notification is even greater than it 
would be in a better functioning privacy regime.  Nonetheless, while we would welcome a data breach 
notification scheme, we emphasise that it should not be seen a substitute for, or alternative too, a range 
of other improvements to privacy law and its implementation.  Some improvements have just been 
enacted, but there are many others that are still needed in addition to breach notification. 
Importance of case studies 
We submit that well publicized case studies of breaches and how they have been responded to should 
be compulsory reading for senior managers in both the private and public sectors.  The Privacy 
Commissioner has published reports on some of the better known Australian cases.  We draw attention 
in particular to the breach, earlier in 2012, by the New Zealand Accident Compensation Commission 
(ACC).  Presentations from ACC managers, including the CEO, and from the New Zealand Privacy 
Commissioner at a recent iappANZ annual conference
5
 gave a comprehensive and candid insight into 
both the risk to organizations from privacy breaches and into how to respond to a breach – both what to 
do and what not to do.  There may be other published case studies which would be equally valuable. 
We suggest this both as an input to the government’s further consideration of the issue, and also as an 
important component of any new requirement – it would be important that as many ‘case studies’ of 
actual breaches and resulting notifications as possible were made public, through the PC/OAIC. 
Definitions and scope 
A second general point relates to terminology (and scope).  Around the world, ‘data breach notification’ 
has become the common generic description, and has been the term used in recent Australian debate, 
and practice (see for instance the Privacy Commissioner’s Data Breach Notification Guide  which 
adopted ‘data breach’ in its latest edition, replacing ‘personal information security breach …’ in an 
earlier version).   
The Discussion Paper uses the term ‘privacy breach notification’ as well as ‘data breach notification’ 
without adequately exploring the significance of the wording.  We can see both pros and cons in the two 
terms.  ‘Data’ correctly connotes that the subject matter is personal information (the subset of privacy 
protected by the Privacy Act 1988, and similar State and Territory laws), rather than wider privacy 
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‘breaches’ or intrusions such as some other forms of surveillance.  On the other hand, there is a risk that 
‘data breach is seen as synonomous with a security breach, which is arguably too narrow as the 
desirable scope for a mandatory requirement.   
The Discussion Paper confirms its limited aspirations by suggesting notification as a possible requirement 
‘...where certain types of personal information are accessed, obtained, used, disclosed to, copied, or 
modified by unauthorised persons.’ (p.2).   
While this reflects the ALRC’s definition, it would seem to exclude three other categories of breach: 
(a)  inappropriate access, use or disclosure (i.e. contrary to use and disclosure principles) by 
authorised persons (this may involve another type of breach of the security principles such as 
IPP 4 or NPP 4 in the federal Privacy Act – APP 11 in the new scheme). We note that the 
definition of ‘Data Breach’ in the Privacy Commissioner’s Guide is wider – ‘Data breach means, 
for the purpose of this guide, when personal information held by an agency or organisation is 
lost or subjected to unauthorised access, use, modification, disclosure, or other misuse.’ 
(b) Breaches of data quality principles (such as IPP 8 and NPP 3, and the new APP 10) that arise for 
reasons other than a security breach. 
(c) Breaches of other privacy principles, such as a failure to give proper notice to individuals, or 
excessive or unfair collection.  
We assume that the proposed privacy breach notification scheme is intended to be to be limited to 
‘information privacy breaches, but not breaches in the third category (c) above.  However, we submit 
that it should certainly cover breaches of types (a) and possibly (b),  as well as the ‘… by unauthorised 
persons’ category which is currently all that would appear to be proposed.  
We submit that any mandatory notification scheme should use the term ‘Data Breach’ with the 
definition from the Privacy Commissioner’s Guide as the basis, but possibly also including breaches of 
the data quality principle.  We have used the term ‘data breach’ in this submission to have this meaning. 
A wider scheme for IT security? 
Another scope issue is the question of whether a data breach notification scheme should apply more 
widely to data breaches not involving personal information.  We appreciate that this is beyond the scope 
of the Discussion Paper and of any likely scheme in the near future.  However, we submit that many of 
the public interest arguments for data breach notification would apply equally to a much wider range of 
IT security breaches.  We suggest that the government canvass the views of the IT industry, security 
professionals and all relevant government agencies about the value of a wider scheme.  This 
consultation should not however delay development and implementation of a scheme for breaches 
involving personal information as an important addition to privacy law.  
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Key questions (posed in the Discussion Paper) 
1. Should Australia introduce a mandatory data breach notification law? 
1.1 Are the current voluntary data breach notification arrangements sufficient? 
1.2 Should the Government introduce a mandatory data breach notification law? 
The APF considers that individuals have a fundamental right to be informed of any data breach involving 
personal information about them. The right of individuals to be notified is not merely based upon the 
potential adverse consequences of the release of personal information, such as identity fraud, but is an 
aspect of personal autonomy
6
. As pointed out in the ALRC report, absent legal compulsion, data 
controllers have insufficient incentives to notify individuals of data breaches. In particular, the adverse 
reputational effects that follow from acknowledging data breach notifications are a powerful 
disincentive. The Discussion Paper sets out a number of additional rationales for mandatory 
notifications, including giving individuals the opportunity to mitigate harms arising from a breach and 
the incentives provided for improving data security. While important, the APF regards the rationales 
identified in the Discussion Paper as subsidiary to the right of individuals to be informed. 
The OAIC’s voluntary guidelines are not sufficient to deal with the problem of under-reporting of data 
breaches. The current guidelines are, in most respects, vague and ambiguous. They provide insufficient 
practical guidance, even for those seeking to comply. More importantly, voluntary guidelines fail to 
address the fundamental problem of insufficient incentives for data controllers to reveal unauthorised 
disclosures.  
The main argument against mandatory notification laws is the potential cost imposed on data 
controllers. The APF considers that entities which collect and store personal information have 
fundamental obligations to be accountable to individuals for the security of that information, and to be 
transparent about dealings with the information, especially unauthorised releases. As pointed out by the 
ALRC, notification laws are desirable to ‘improve accountability, openness and transparency in the 
handling of personal information by agencies and organisations’.
7
  The cost of accounting for 
unauthorised disclosures should be seen as an inherent part of the collection and processing of personal 
information. Furthermore, in the electronic environment, the costs of informing individuals are far from 
prohibitive. 
The APF does not consider that voluntary guidelines can ever provide sufficient incentives for data 
controllers to notify individuals of data breaches.  
Accordingly, the APF supports the introduction of a mandatory data breach notification law. 
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2. Which breaches should be reported? 
2.1 What should be the appropriate test to determine the trigger for notification? 
2.2 Should it be based on a ‘catch all’ test, or based on more specific triggers, or another test?  
2.3 What specific elements should be included in the notification trigger?  
  
An important feature of any mandatory data notification regime is the ‘trigger’ for notification.  There 
are two aspects to this – the first is the definition of a breach which we have already discussed above.  
The second is the criteria of significance.  
In relation to significance criteria, the APF agrees with the ALRC that the notification regime should be 
proportionate to the potential harm caused by a data breach.
8
 In this respect, the Attorney-General’s 
Discussion Paper points out that it may not be desirable for minor breaches to be notified because of the 
administrative burden placed on data controllers, the risk of notification fatigue by individuals and the 
lack of usefulness where mitigation is impossible.
9
 
Applying the fundamental principle that individuals have a right to be informed of data breaches, the 
APF considers that the trigger for notification must not be set too high. Nevertheless, the APF 
acknowledges the potential costs of notifying minor breaches, and that individuals may become de-
sensitised, or unduly alarmed, by over-notification. On the other hand, there is a real danger that 
imprecision in setting the trigger may be used to avoid disclosure. As the Discussion Paper points out, 
data controllers may well interpret a trigger based on the nature of ‘harm’ restrictively by, for example, 
confining it to the release of credit card information. 
Applying a version of Solove’s ‘data abuse pyramid’
10
, the APF supports a tiered notification regime, 
which includes mandatory notification of individuals where there is a risk of harm, but also imposes 
requirements, including notification of the OAIC where this trigger is not met. 
First, the APF recommends the application of a ‘catch-all’ test whereby mandatory notification of 
affected individuals is triggered by a data breach, but only where there is a ‘risk of harm’ (Test B in the 
scheme we suggest later in this submission). In supporting this test, the APF notes that it applies a lesser 
threshold than the ‘real risk of serious harm’ test recommended by the ALRC. Given that the ‘risk of 
harm’ standard is subject to interpretation, the APF recommends that the OAIC be required to develop 
binding guidelines which provide more detailed standards, and which could include specific triggers. 
Second, the APF accepts that there may be circumstances in which it may be difficult for a data 
controller to determine whether or not there has been a data breach. Accordingly, where an entity 
reasonably suspects that a data breach has occurred, and regardless of whether or not there is a risk of 
harm, the entity should be required to consider whether or not to notify affected (or potentially 
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affected) individuals of the potential data breach. Moreover, in those circumstances, the entity should 
still be required to report potential breaches to the OAIC. 
The APF submits that entities be required to notify an individual where they have a reasonable belief 
that there is a significant actual or suspected data breach that poses a risk of harm to the individual. 
The APF submits that entities be required to notify the PC/OAIC of any significant actual or suspected 
data breach (whether or not it poses a risk of harm).     
 3.  Who should decide on whether to notify? 
3.1  Who should be notified about the breach?  
3.2  Which of the below should decide whether to notify?  
(i) the organisation or agency; 
(ii) the Commissioner; or  
(iii) the organisation/agency in consultation with the Commissioner 
The decision that a breach or suspected breach should be notified must inevitably rest with the entity 
concerned.  It is however essential that entities are given detailed guidance as to the relevant criteria, 
and this should be provided through a combination of the law and supporting guidelines. 
The APF submits that a breach notification scheme should involve several tiers of decision making and 
notification, without making the scheme unnecessarily complex. 
We do not believe that the Privacy Commissioner (or OAIC) should be given a ‘gatekeeper’ role in 
relation to most ‘notifiable’ breaches – rather that is should play a ‘backstop’ reviewer role to ensure 
that entities are correctly applying the law and related guidelines. 
Entities should be obliged to set up internal systems to report all actual or suspected data breaches to a 
designated officer.  That officer should then be responsible for notifying all breaches or suspected 
breaches that pass a first test (Test A) to the OAIC, and separately initiate notification of affected 
individuals of any breaches that pass a second test (Test B), unless there are specified public interest 
grounds for not doing so (Test C).  
The Privacy Commissioner should be responsible for advising any entity reporting a  breach that in the 
entity’s view passes Test A but not Test B if, in the Commissioner’s view it does in fact pass Test B (but 
not Test C) and should therefore be notified to affected individuals.  The Commissioner would also 
review cases where an entity had decided that a breach passed Test B but also passed Test C, and had 
therefore not initiated notification of affected individuals (see below). 
Test A would be of significance. On receiving an internal or external report of an actual or suspected 
breach, and entity’s designated officer would make (and document) a judgement as to whether the 
breach was significant enough to warrant applying Test B and C. The judgement would be based on 
application of Guidelines which the PC/OAIC would be required to develop and issue. All breaches that 
pass Test A should be notified to the PC/OAIC (after a judgement was made about Tests B & C). 
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Test B would be of risk of harm. The designated officer, taking advice as required, would decide if the 
actual or suspected breach posed a sufficient risk, or potential risk, of harm to at least some affected 
individuals. The judgement would be based on application of Guidelines which the PC/OAIC would be 
required to develop and issue. If the breach passed Test B, the entity would be required to initiate 
notification of affected individuals, as well as notifying the PC/OAIC. 
The guidelines in relation to Test A and B would between them cover such matters as the sensitivity of 
the personal information involved in the breach.  The categories of ‘sensitive information’ defined in the 
Privacy Act for the purposes of additional protection should be expressly considered in the guidelines, 
although we do not pre-judge whether they should automatically trigger either Test A or Test B.  Other 
categories of information may be at least as ‘significant’ for the purposes of both tests, such as biometric 
information, which, if it falls into the wrong hands may pose a particular risk because it cannot be 
repudiated (c.f. a credit card number which can be cancelled and replaced). 
The significance test (Test A) should not be a simple as for instance the mere number of affected 
individuals.  A small release of sensitive information may be considered ‘significant’ while a larger 
volume breach, but only involving more trivial personal information, may not be.  Because significance 
and risk of harm are so closely related, we anticipate that a single set of guidelines from the PC/OAIC 
would cover both Tests A & B. 
Test C would be a public interest in not notifying individuals. The designated officer, at the same time 
as making their judgement on Test B, would consider if any of the specified public interest grounds for 
not notifying affected individuals applied.  The judgement would be based on application of Guidelines 
which the PC/OAIC would be required to develop and issue, specifying relevant public interest grounds. 
The breach notification scheme should operate independently from, and without prejudice to, the 
Privacy Commissioner’s functions of complaint handling and own motion investigations, even where 
these involve security breaches. 
4. What should be reported (content and method of notification), and in what time 
frame?  
4.1  What should be the form or medium in which the data breach notification is provided?  
Notification to the PC/OAIC should occur through a carefully designed web-form submission process. 
Notifications to affected individuals, where applicable, should generally use the normal form of 
communication between the organisation and its clients, provided this meets applicable security 
standards. In the majority of cases, communication is likely to be via email, and should not therefore 
involve significant cost.  
4.2  Should there be a set time limit for notification or a test based on notifying as soon as 
is practicable or reasonable?  
There must be strict time limits for most notifications, with any exceptions or extensions subject to 
clearly defined criteria.  Initial notification to the PC/OAIC should generally be within 48 hours of an 
entity’s designated officer becoming aware of the actual/suspected breach.  Notification of affected 
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individuals, where applicable, should generally be within 5 calendar days of the decision (whether by the 
entity or by the PC/OAIC on review) that notification of individuals is required.  The APF would expect 
that in many cases, notification of affected individuals could take place much earlier. 
4.3  What should be the content of the notification? 
Where an entity decides that a breach or suspected breach has passed Test A, notice to the PC/OAIC 
should include an initial assessment of:  
• the nature of the personal information involved in the breach – usually by reference to ‘plain 
english’ descriptions of relevant database fields;  
• the date and time on which, or period over which, the breach occurred;  
• the potential impact of the breach including any risk of harm to affected individuals;  
• the scale of the breach – e.g. was the entire customer base affected, or only users of one 
product or service;  
• why the breach occurred – e.g. was it due to out of date software, or human error; remedial 
action taken to date: 
and, where the entity has decided notification of affected individuals is not appropriate: 
• a justification of that decision, on the basis of Tests B or C  
Notice to affected individuals, where applicable, should include all of the same information as is notified 
to the PC/OAIC, and in addition: 
• ‘Plain English’ information about  any action that can be taken by the individual to minimise any 
risk of adverse effects, including links to relevant websites, 
• A clear explanation of the rights of the individual to lodge a complaint under the Privacy Act or 
other relevant laws, including links to relevant websites and other contact details.  
Notices both to the PC/OAIC and, where applicable, to affected individuals should be required to be 
updated periodically where significant fresh information becomes available. 
5. What should be the penalty for failing to notify when required to do so?  
5.1  Should there be a penalty or sanction for failing to comply with a legislative 
requirement to notify?  
5.2 If so, what should be the penalty or sanction, and the appropriate level of that penalty 
or sanction? 
There must be significant financial penalties for non-compliance, especially as the design of the scheme 
will place the onus on entities experiencing breaches to make the threshold decisions.  The corollary of 
this ‘light touch’ regime (as opposed to mandatory reporting, at least to the PC/OAIC of all breaches) is 
the need for strong sanctions against any entity which deliberately evades the objective of the scheme 
by blatantly mis-applying the Tests.   The PC/OAIC should also publish a list of entities that have been 
found to have breached their obligations under a mandatory data breach notification scheme.  This 
would ensure both financial and reputational incentives for compliance. 
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The penalty scheme should be modelled on the new Privacy Act scheme as recently amended.  
6. Who should be subject to a mandatory data breach notification law? 
6.1  Who should be subject to a mandatory data breach notification law? 
6.2  Should the scope of a mandatory data breach notification law be the same as the 
existing scope of the Privacy Act? 
All APP entities (those with obligations under the Privacy Act) should be subject to any new mandatory 
data breach notification scheme.  The ALRC recommended a review of existing exemptions and criticised 
‘blanket’ exemptions.  APF submits that any exceptions to any of the obligations under privacy law – 
including any new data breach notification scheme – should be specific, limited, clearly justified and in 
most cases conditional. 
There are good arguments for applying a data breach notification scheme to many of the entities 
currently exempt, in whole or part, from the Privacy Act (such as small business organisations, political 
parties, media organisations engaged in journalism etc). Some of these require detailed further 
discussion and to avoid delaying introduction of a data breach notification scheme, it should initially 
have the same scope as the Privacy Act, with the issue of exceptions and exemptions to be addressed at 
the same time as for those applying to other Privacy Act obligations. 
7. Should there be an exception for law enforcement activities?  
7.1  Should there be an exception for law enforcement activities? 
7.2  Would such an exception add anything to the ALRC’s proposed public interest 
exception? 
There should be no blanket exception from any data breach notification requirements for law 
enforcement activities, and no exception at all from the requirement to notify the PC/OAIC of all 
significant breaches.   
There should be a limited set of criteria for exceptions to the requirement to notify affected individuals 
where another public interest substantially outweighs both the individual and public interests in 
individuals being notified.  One such criterion would be where notification of affected individuals would 
significantly hinder a law enforcement investigation.  This might include both active investigations by law 
enforcement agencies and, subject to strict conditions, preliminary investigations by the entity 
concerned prior to any referral to a law enforcement agency. 
The PC/OAIC should issue guidance about the criteria for entities to make a decision not to notify 
individuals (Test C in the scheme we have suggested above).  Such decisions would be subject to review 
by the PC/OAIC.  
The public interest decision (Test C) should be one for the relevant entity to make in initially.  They may 
take into account the views of any other entities that are involved (e.g. a law enforcement agency), and 
from the PC/OAIC but should not take directions from them to NOT notify (unless required by law to do 
so). The PC/OAIC would however have the power to direct an entity to notify affected individuals, 
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overriding the entity’s decision that Test C applied, having taken into account both the reasons given by 
the entity and representations from any other interested party.  
Passing Test C should not be a once and for ever decision.  Individuals are entitled to be informed as 
soon as practicable about any significant breach that posed a risk of harm to them. An entity’s 
designated officer should be required to periodically review breaches that had passed Test B and Test C 
to assess whether the grounds for passing Test C (and therefore not notifying affected individuals) still 
applied.  If the grounds no longer applied, the entity should initiate notification of affected individuals – 
however long since the breach occurred and whatever remedial action had been taken. 
 Other matters 
Register of Notifications 
APF submits that the PC/OAIC should be required to maintain a register of notified breaches.  To avoid 
deterring entities from reporting breaches, entries in the register which were of significant breaches not 
posing a risk of harm would not be public.  Where, however, breaches passed Test B, but not Test C, and 
therefore triggered notification of affected individuals, specified details should be made public. Breaches 
which passed Test B and also Test C, justifying NOT notifying affected individuals, would be included in 
the non-public section of the Register (until such time as the justification for non-notification no longer 
applied). 
The PC/OAIC should be required to publicly report regularly (more often than in an Annual Report) on 
the number and type of notifications, including those in the non-public sections of the Register.  
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